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This paper investigates the relationship between official development assistance, foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and domestic investment in landlocked and transition economies of Central 
Asia. It is important for donor countries to understand whether their investments induce foreign 
direct investment or not. If they do, it creates ground for public-private partnership. If they do not, 
then it points to reassessing mechanisms to ‘aid architecture’. For public multinational 
enterprises, it is important to gain positive public opinions and further explore new markets. For 
governments, it is crucial to devise policies to favour foreign transfers that bring more welfare 
improvements. Our results from seemingly unrelated regression for regional sample demonstrate 
that: (a) foreign aid and FDI are complementing flows, and, (b) we found crowding-in effect: 
domestic investments increase FDI and vice versa, but not foreign aid. We conclude that there is 
evidence of public-private investment partnership. 
 
Keywords: Central Asia; transition economies; foreign direct investment; official development 
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Introduction 
 
Do external financial flows help developing countries to grow? This is one of the most important 
questions in economic growth and development literature, especially as financial resources in 
developed economies are becoming more limited. Every year, OECD
1
 donors give enormous 
amount of financial resource to five landlocked post-communist and complex Central Asian 
economies (CA5)
2
 in terms of official development assistance (ODA), which is broadly 
humanitarian assistance from developed countries
3
. ODA is administered by OECD 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) that consists of 24 developed countries
4
.  On the 
other side, multinationals launch their projects via foreign direct investment (FDI) searching for 
more profit. Both of these transfers are crucial to transition low-income nations. FDI helps 
recipient countries to encourage rise in specialisation and rising income of low-skilled that would 
eventually lift their wages and decrease inequality. ODA aims to improve social welfare, 
decrease inequality and raise skilled workers pool through technical assistance. At least on a 
conceptual level, both flows extend common features to recipient countries.  
In a historically important International Conference for Development (2002) document, “The 
Monterey Consensus”5, and follow-up Doha Declaration on Financing for Development outcome 
report, FDI is viewed as an addition to ODA
6. 
UNCTAD also stress this point in advising local 
governments: “Channelling some ODA into investment projects financed jointly with domestic 
financial institutions…”7. It is important for donor countries to understand whether their 
investments also induce foreign direct investment. At first it seems they are two different flows 
and no link exists because FDI is a capital account item and ODA is a transfer payment of 
current account though both constituent balance of payments entries. On the other hand, donors 
who give assistance are also ones who conduct FDI, called ‘vanguard effect’ (Kimura and Todo, 
2010). If there is in fact a connection, then it could create grounds for public-private partnership, 
such as tiding aid with domestic private sector investments.  If there is no connection, then it 
points to reassessing the mechanisms of ‘aid architecture’ for long-term civil society building 
goals. For public multinational enterprises (MNEs) it is equally important to gain positive public 
opinion and to further explore new markets for profit seeking motives. For recipient local 
societies and their governments, it is crucial to devise policies to favour a particular foreign 
capital that brings tangible contribution to domestic welfare improvements.
 
The central focus of this paper is to explore a possible link between aggregate ODA and FDI 
in five landlocked Central Asian countries with similar socio-economic situations and financial 
systems. Harms and Lutz (2006) studied 76 developing countries before 2000, excluding CA(5) 
economies, and found that ODA is a complement to FDI. Moreover, they also found that 
stimulating effect of ODA is higher in countries with unfavourable institutional environment. We 
specifically test their latter conclusion to see whether this also holds for Central Asia economies.   
The link between FDI-ODA was studied only by few scholars and there is no specific 
consensus yet. For example, Kosak and Tobin (2006) state in their panel study of 90 various 
growth level group of countries from 1970 to 2001 that FDI and ODA are unrelated, as each had 
specific effects on economic growth. Caselli and Feyrer (2007) study groups of developed and 
developing countries also emphasise that foreign investment and foreign aid are more like 
substitutes than complements.  None of mentioned studies above includes Central Asian 
economies. According to the theory of FDI, private investments are favoured more when certain 
business conditions in host countries are met, such as macroeconomic stability, infrastructure, 
regulation and financial system intact (Navaretti and Venables 2004, Globerman and Shapiro 
2002, Davies 2011). Foreign aid is essentially targeted at improving these conditions.  
To quantify the above concerns we built a panel data set and estimated our data by 
simultaneous equation modelling of seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) proposed by Zellner 
(1962) to account the issue about simultaneity and cross-section error correlation. Different panel 
data techniques were employed in their research on FDI for post-communist transition 
economies (Lansbury et al. 1996; Bengoa and Sanches-Robles 2003; Campos and Kinoshita 
2003; Johnson 2006; Kenisarin 2008) among others.    
Our result on regional (pooled) regression level supports Harms and Lutz (2006) conclusions 
and we found positive influence of ODA on FDI inflows into CA(5). The same complementary 
effect of ODA is also corroborated in studies by Hien (2008), Selaya and Sunasen (2008), 
Asiedy et al., (2009) and Bhavan (2011). Moreover, we also found reverse effect, that FDI also 
attracts foreign aid (ODA). 
We contribute to the empirical literature on FDI-ODA link by bringing new insights about 
foreign aid effects in less studied Central Asian regions that could be helpful for international 
donor organisations, so that they could better devise their programs and do ‘aid architecture’, 
possibly enable better predictions of future aid packages. It could also provide thoughts on re-
assessing public-private collaboration. Our understanding is that, the present paper is the first 
paper that studies foreign transfer flows’ link in five remote economies in Central Asia. 
The structure of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 covers related past literature. Section 3 
discusses FDI-ODA trends in Central Asian region. Section 4 covers our empirical investigation 
and data used. Section 5 contains a discussion on our results. Section 6 summarise the principal 
results and highlights future research prospects.  
 
 
Theoretical Considerations 
 
There are various ways foreign aid could affect foreign direct investment in host countries. 
According to Harms and Lutz (2006), if foreign aid is directed to infrastructure projects, human 
capital and complementary inputs could have “infrastructure effect”. Enhanced domestic 
conditions could lure foreign investors. Inflows of foreign aid are also expected to raise countries 
marginal product of capital (MPC) of domestic firms, which in turn attracts FDI. Another effect, 
‘rent-seeking’, might also appear, possibly arrive from the fact that local firms compete for rents 
from foreign aid. This situation reduces MPC that would results in less innovation activities, 
R&D spending and reduction in efficiency (Svensson, 2000; Harms and Lutz, 2006). The 
outcome of this behaviour would be more reliance on aid, which would discourage FDI. Clearly, 
foreign aid could add to ‘financing effect’ that directly augments the balance of payment of the 
recipient country, as it helps foreigners to secure their profit repatriation.  Arellano et al. (2009) 
argues that aid could increase the supply of tradable goods and reduce the price of non-tradable 
goods. They call it ’Dutch-disease effect’ that discourages the FDI. Kimura and Todo (2010) 
claim that there is also ‘vanguard effect’ of foreign aid, meaning countries who give aid also tend 
to place an FDI in specific host economies. Mody et al. (2003) state that there is an ‘information 
effect’ that foreign aid is carrying into host countries. Private information which is not accessible 
to the foreigner is revealed to investor via foreign aid. Aid programs help investors to collect 
data and build a picture of recipient countries.  
In general, channels of foreign capital entering the region could be outlined as follows: 
foreign aid is directed into social infrastructure targeting complementary inputs, namely, health, 
education, water related projects and/or economic infrastructure, including energy, 
communication, and transportation.  FDI is focused on physical capital projects, production, 
manufacturing, banking industries and natural resource extracting sectors. Numerous researches 
were devoted to analyses of FDI, but very few researches addressed the Central Asian (CA) 
region that is located in the middle of the East and West continents trade route
8.
 Several studies 
focused on FDI effects of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (De 
Melo et al. 1997; Gylfason 2000; Edmiston et al. 2003; Bayulgen 2005; Boudier-Bensebaa 2005; 
Penev 2007; Kenisarin and Andrews-Speed 2008), but they were under the framework of 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
9
 or Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)
10
 that 
included countries with different economic setup. Studies that focused solely on these five 
countries are scarce and addressed primarily the social and political structure (such as in 
Gleason, 2001; Dowling and Wignaraja, 2006). Some studies presented a narrative of economic 
policy developments in the region. For example, Dikkaya and Keles (2006) address the FDI in 
Kyrgyzstan through a case study approach. Other scholars, for instance Venables (2009) showed 
benefits of regional integration in Central Asia via general equilibrium tools. Pomfret (2005, 
2010) addressed Central Asian regional trade relations and policies, energy institutions, 
regionalism and integration into the world economy. Hoen (2010) expressed his opinion on 
transitional path of Central Asian countries. Kalyuzhnova (2003, 2008, 2011) thoughtfully 
reflects on social and economic developments, and energy related issues. 
Moreover, the direct link between FDI and ODA was studied only in a handful of papers to 
the best of our knowledge. For example, Karakaplan et al. (2005), Harms and Lutz (2006), 
Kosack and Tobin (2006), and Selaya and Sunesen (2008) study broad groups of developing 
countries. Kimura and Todo (2010) and Blaise (2005) focus on Japanese FDI and aid flow 
interactions. Carro and Larrú (2010) look at FDI-ODA link in Argentina and Brazil. Kapfer et al. 
(2007) construct infrastructure aid-FDI links for 59 countries. Asiedu and Nandwa (2009) show 
that aid mitigate appropriation risk on FDI for 35 low-income and 28 Sub-Saharan Africa. Hien 
(2008) looks at FDI-ODA in 28 provinces of Vietnam. Bhavan et al. (2011) analyse nexus 
between FDI and ODA for South Asian economies. Beladi and Oladi (2006) apply the FDI-ODA 
link into a three-goods general equilibrium model and found that when foreign aid is directed to 
public good, it could crowd out foreign investment in the recipient country, when given a factor 
intensity condition.  
The findings on FDI-ODA link are mixed. Karakaplan et al. (2005) found that aid has a 
negative effect on FDI. On the other hand, Kosack and Tobin (2006) state that FDI and ODA are 
unrelated due to aid goes to support human capital, and FDI is private and thus goes to physical 
capital. Carro and Larrú (2010) also could not find any systematic relationship between FDI and 
ODA flows.  Caselli and Feyrer (2007) studied marginal product of capital (MPC) and report that 
MPC is roughly the same across developing countries, and inflow of foreign aid only reduces 
MPC. In their study, foreign aid is more substituted to FDI. In their study of 81 developing 
countries (excluding Central Asia from 1988-1999), Harms and Lutz (2006) claims that FDI and 
ODA are complements. Moreover, they argue that after controlling for regulation in host 
countries, catalysing effect of aid is stronger in countries with unfavourable institutional 
environment. In South Asian countries foreign aid drives the FDI in the study of Bhavan et al. 
(2011).   
 
Foreign Transfers’ Trends in Central Asia 
 
From 1991, all five countries declared their independence and started building their economies. 
Kazakhstan is the largest and by territory is the half the size of Europe
11
.
 
Central Asia is under 
energy related political game between USA, Russia and China, according to Financial Times 
“Investing in Central Asia 2008” Special Report (FT.com, 2010). The importance of studying 
capital flows into these countries is justified by its strategic geographical location, which gives 
European Union economies, USA, Japan and China trading route to Afghanistan and further to 
the Middle East. Prospective growth and stability in the region could stimulate international 
trade, capital movements and intra Central Asian collaboration that could favour foreign 
investors. The region is rich in natural resources, especially in oil and natural gas, minerals and 
metals – they are of primary interest to multinational enterprises as input factors. For European 
Union, Central Asia is the potential source of future energy supply, especially natural gas.   
Another reason to investigate FDI inflows would be that local firms are restricted and have 
constrains to external funding opportunities. Availability of finance to support their businesses 
via FDI inflows (stock, portfolio and loans) is a very favourable condition to revive the 
landlocked region’s economic development.12 Liquidity constraints would prevent local firms 
from creating competitive advantages through rigidities of exporting their goods. The region 
demonstrated high potential for market growth and trade relations. Industrial structure of Central 
Asian region characterised by oligopolistic markets in the main industrial sectors affiliated to 
mineral resources/energy, and with monopolistic domestic competition. At the same time 
countries have their particular outlook for economic reforms and international policy and local 
developments.  The major type of FDI in Central Asia is Greenfield investment
13
. This is when 
MNEs create their foreign operation units overseas and integrate vertically. Also, FDI inflows 
are mostly export oriented and not directed to serve local market according to ADB World 
Investment Report (2010). Major investors are firms from USA, Japan, China, and developing 
Asia. Foreign capital lands in oil and energy sector, while service sector is almost untouched. 
This may be due to fact that still after 1991, economies could not efficiently build sound 
regulations, functioning financial services and advances in structural reforms. MNEs entered the 
domestic economies of CA(5) vertically thus reducing the transfer costs and financial risks. The 
major types of foreign investment only happen after reaching agreement with top government 
officials. The weak domestic firms’ competition gives competitive advantage to multinational 
firms. MNEs that possess superior knowledge and technology simply enjoy the amateur markets 
of CA(5). In practice, MNEs enter the markets with political stability in the region as the only 
concern according to Krugman (1979).  
 
Table 1. Inward FDI, ODA and Domestic Investment for the period 1992-2009.  
Country  FDI 
 
ODA 
 
DOM 
 
GDP 
 Average 
FDI 
Flows 
($) 
Annual 
Averag
e FDI 
growth 
(%) 
Average 
ODA 
flows 
($) 
Annual 
Average 
ODA 
growth 
(%) 
Average 
DOM 
Flows 
($) 
Annua
l 
Avera
ge 
DOM 
growth 
(%) 
Average 
GDP 
($) 
Annual 
Average 
GDP 
growth 
(%) 
KAZ 1,100.90 7.9 78.55 -10.5 41,440.50 -10.0 2,945.78     3.6 
KYR 20.96 51.3 117.08 -13.7 675.47 -8.3 451.56 0.7 
TAJ 794.90 48.1 1,134.64 -21.9 19,606.27 -16.5 313.97 0.3 
TKM 4,994.02 5.0 14,175.18 -17.4 1,322.909.27 -26.5 1,684.77 2.3 
UZB 19.69 -23.7 80.17 -23.7 4,686.86 -26.6 474.44 2.8 
Note: KAZ-Kazakhstan, KYR-Kyrgyzstan, TAJ-Tajikistan, TKM-Turkmenistan and UZB-Uzbekistan. All data for 
FDI –inward foreign direct investment, ODA- total official development assistance net, DOM-gross fixed capital 
formation  and GDP-gross domestic product are measured in per capita real 2000 US Dollars in millions. GDP-in 
thousands values. Source: UNCTAD , UNCTADstat (online database,2011) and own calculations.   
From Table 1 we can see that, on average, Central Asian countries are different in terms of 
attracting FDI with the leading position of Turkmenistan. If all nations average growth was 
positive, Uzbekistan on average would end on a big negative side, with 23.7 percent decline in 
real terms per capita. The first two countries in the ranking of the most attractive destinations for 
FDI flows are Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, which both have abundant oil and gas resources.  
Moreover, the average growth of ODA was negative for all economies. The foreign aid also 
declined approximately fourfold from $242 million to $51 million between the sample periods. 
On the other hand, Kyrgyzstan is in second place for ODA after Turkmenistan and has huge 
mineral resources of non-ferrous metals (mercury ores and antimony), substantial coal reserves 
and gold, while Tajikistan is another region attracting much of the foreign aid and very rich in 
mineral deposits such as metallic ores (zinc, iron, mercury, gold, tin and lead) and common salts 
(such as carbonates, fluorites). On the other hand, domestic investment (DOM) had decreased on 
average terms. Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan per capita real gross fixed investments 
surged. Overall, annual growth is still negative.  We observe the pattern of increase of FDI and 
decline of DOM that raise a question on whether FDI served financing the domestic investment 
in the region. We discuss this issue later in the paper.   
 
 
Econometric methodology 
 
Empirical  Model 
 
We build a model with three equations: one for foreign direct investment (FDI), one for foreign 
aid (ODA) and one for domestic investment (DOM). The reason is that each foreign flow has its 
own mechanism based on previous contributions. FDI is administered through a private channel 
and aid is through a public one. Both of these flows are part of balance of payments. Hence, we 
would assume some reverse association between them. Additionally, we would like to test 
external flows’ effect on investments by local economies. This carries a crucial point: if foreign 
flows reduce domestic investment, such as financing, this means that economies of CA (5) are 
less concerned with long-term growth prospects. If they complement domestic flows then we 
consider it as a positive event that meliorates process of transition. Since we deal with capital 
movement, we also include KOF globalisation index (Glob) to control for rigidities of recipient 
economies (Dreher, 2006). The year variable (Year) is included due to the need to control for 
individual country effects and because our sample is in long form (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009).  
Allowing for reverse causality or simultaneity, meaning FDI, ODA and domestic investment 
(DOM) are defined simultaneously, we estimate our model, through solving three equations 
simultaneously using seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) technique. In this way we are better 
able to reveal the possible link between these investment flows. Thus, our empirical model is set 
up as follows:  
 
                                                                        
                                                                        
                                                                        
                                                                                                                     
(1) 
where  - countries (N=5) and  -time frame (T=18), FDI- foreign direct investment, ODA- official 
development assistance, ala- foreign aid, DOM- gross fixed capital formation in host country 
minus FDI since fixed capital portion of external flows (Yonas, 2011), Glob- KOF is the 
globalisation index.  
We have included Year to account for country effects and also for technological progress. 
Given dimensions of our sample the estimation was implemented by employing SUR estimation 
technique proposed by Zellner (1962). This method allows us to jointly estimate three equations 
for our sample. Also, SUR estimator is based on small N=5 and large T=18 that is the feature of 
our sample
14
. SUR imposes each country to have its own coefficient vector unlike pooled OLS or 
even fixed effect (FE) estimators (Baum 2006, p.238). Moreover, it allows cross-section error 
component correlation, i.e. contemporaneous correlation. Estimator is efficient under the 
homoscedasticity condition which is managed by imposing bootstrapped standard errors. SUR 
estimation permits us to allow for the serial correlation over panels. Our estimates are 
complacent with maximum likelihood estimates due to specification of iteration over disturbance 
covariance matrix and parameter estimates.     
The panel data advantage over cross section and time series is that we get bigger sample 
which increase degrees of freedom and reduce collinearity between variables. According to 
literature, using SUR would improve the efficiency of our estimates over the traditional pooled 
OLS (POLS) methods, where we cannot simultaneously estimate two equations gives more 
efficiency gain. Hence, we prefer the SUR methodology. 
 
  
Data  
 
We construct a long form panel data where time dimension (T=18) exceeds the number of 
countries (N=5). All yearly aggregate variables are in real values
15
 transformed into natural log 
to reduce variability and expressed in per capita terms to make feasible comparisons. We include 
a few explanatory variables because of our data dimensions; otherwise we will lose degrees of 
freedom. The data summary, variables descriptions and sources are presented in Table A1 in the 
Appendix. 
Firstly, we chose these five countries, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan, because they share similar economic, geographic and political setup. The 
remaining ten Former Soviet Union (FSU) Republics were different from the historical and geo-
political view
16
. From 1991, all our five Republics broke away from the Soviet Union and 
established their sovereign states
17
.  Secondly, the so-called initial conditions principle appears if 
we were to look at the economic factors driving foreign direct investment into this region (De 
Melo et al., 1997). Not all Soviet Union countries were the same before the break; Baltic, 
Transcaucasus and Eastern Europe countries had industrial bases, while Central Asian countries 
could be classified as agricultural and natural resources regions.  Thirdly, the inclusion of only 
these five countries avoids the problem of sampling bias, for example, comparing countries with 
different levels of industrial setup that is very important in empirical investigation. Following our 
initial theoretical discussion and from past literature as mentioned in earlier sections, we have 
constructed relevant variables for our model. Statistical reporting in home countries is not 
comprehensive and is underdeveloped, so we use aggregate databases from international 
organisations, such as Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and IMF. 
This is coherent with the objective of our ex-post study; to understand FDI-ODA link after 18 
years of independence, 1992-2009
18
.  
 
 
Results  
 
The simultaneous estimation of equation 1 in our total sample is presented in Table 2. 
Explanatory variables explain variability in FDI and ODA equations quite well, at 80% and 
63.5% respectively. We observe that the coefficient for ODA is highly significant, with a one 
unit increase raise FDI by 0.34 units. Since our model is in log-log form, estimates can be 
interpreted as elasticities. This means one percent invested in foreign aid would only induce 
0.34% increase in FDI, which is relatively inelastic At first sight the elasticity appears very low, 
but upon careful inspection at the institutional and social-economic situation this result is 
plausible. This suggests that donors are at least trying to create investment atmosphere through 
their humanitarian projects in CA(5) economies.  
From the ODA equation we infer that 0.49 percent increase in foreign aid is due to one 
percent increase in FDI – this is supported statistically. As one can easily observes, the same link 
produces different and richer results depending from which observation point we select. Most 
importantly, we try to capture the link on the regional level that depicts political decision 
making. Our elaboration on the result is that the ODA arrived earlier than FDI, because it is a 
support to assist countries at the beginning of transition in 1991. The FDI lagged behind due to 
uncertain political and economic situation in the first few years of independence.  For that reason 
we started our analysis from 1992 to give lead time for ODA to be absorbed. Through their 
contacts and establishing offices, representations and embassies of donor countries made 
introduction of their foreign policies to host CA(5) economies.  
The common logic of donor aid is that the aid should stimulate self-sustainable development. 
In another word, donors expect from aid recipients that they will have their own initiatives and 
stimulate economic/social progress after the aid term has finished.  Agencies such as World 
Bank, IMF, ADB, UN, USAID and various embassies carry out their missions and have settled 
offices in CA(5). They served as a connection (or first-hand information) to private foreign 
investors to learn about these countries, make contacts, find the right people, and ultimately 
invest into these countries. Private investors, who are public MNEs, could not individually 
conduct their investment projects, because they had to deal with hidden uncertainty. We suggest 
that ODA helped them to mitigate these risks up to certain degree that are also shown by our 
empirical results. This fact is also illustrated in study of Asiedu et al. (2009) where they 
demonstrate that foreign aid indeed reduce adverse effect of expropriation risk on FDI. They 
found that ODA effect helped to mitigate host country governments’ rigidities. For example, any 
foreign investor could rely on his embassy in CA(5) to get a back-support and assistance as the 
only legitimate “insiders” channel. Our estimates show that ODA had a very important role for 
FDI attraction in Central Asian region from the 1992-2009 period.  
 
 
 
 
  
Table 2. SUR Regional Regression. 
Dep.Var: 
FDI 
 FDI (B.SE) (z) (P-value) 
ODA γ1 0.335         0.137      2.45    0.014      
DOM γ2 0.890    0.084         10.60    0.000      
GLOB γ3 0.028    0.021      1.31    0.190     
YEAR γ4 0.136    0.060      2.25    0.024      
CONSTANT γ0 -275.616    120.433     -2.29    0.022      
Dep.Var: 
ODA 
 ODA (B.SE) (z) (P-value) 
FDI β1 0.489          0.215      2.27    0.023 
DOM β2 0.061       0.241      0.25 0.799     
GLOB β3 -0.002    0.024     -0.08    0.934    
YEAR β4 -0.140     0.068     -2.06    0.039     
CONSTANT β0 280.647        135.450      2.07    0.038 
Dep.Var: 
DOM 
 DOM (B.SE) (z) (P-value) 
FDI δ1 0.871    0.084     10.36    0.000      
ODA δ 2 0.041    0.155      0.27    0.790     
GLOB δ 3 -0.027    0.020     -1.35    0.177     
YEAR δ 4 -0.102    0.059     -1.74    0.082     
CONSTANT δ 0 207.537    117.146      1.77    0.076     
FDI  
Equation: N                                   
 
75 
ODA Equation:  
N 
 
75 
DOM 
Equation: N  
 
75 
R2  0.8070      R2  0.6313 R2  0.8312      
RMSE 1.187041     RMSE 1.379153     RMSE 1.147229     
F-stat /P-
value 
509.71/   0.0000 F-stat /P-value 142.14/   0.0000 F-stat /P-value 516.82/0.0000 
Note: FDI-real log of FDI per capita, DOM-log of real gross fixed capital formation per capita, ODA-log of real 
official development assistance per capita, GLOB-globalisation KOX index.  N-number of observations, R2-
goodness of model fit, B.SE-bootstrapped standard errors (under 400 replications). RMSE-room mean square error. 
F-stat/P-value- shows whether the model’s coefficients are statistically significant.  
 
The positive sign of domestic investment variable (DOM) in FDI equation also makes sense, 
because improvements in domestic infrastructure, coupled with abandoned natural resources, 
would attract investors. This means domestic capital drives increases in foreign direct 
investment. This is natural according to us. Economies that are growing would be demanding 
more of FDI. In opposite, even though ODA grew over time we could not find positive effect of 
domestic investment (DOM) in foreign aid. One possible explanation is that at the early stages of 
economic development, transition countries are more concerned with economic growth and not 
human capital development, for example, complementary inputs. Countries’ current accounts’ 
have increased due to revenues from mineral endowments or other means, which brings 
increased foreign currency reserves. If so, this added to domestic savings which in turn would 
allow substantial investments directed into building infrastructure, plants, and facilities by local 
governments in later years.  
Domestic investment is complemented by FDI shown by statistically significant positive 
sign at 0.87. This finding is also corroborated by looking at FDI equation. Foreign aid (ODA) 
does not seem to influence domestic investment. To be more precise, people are not informed 
enough to participate in money allocation and investment decisions in CA(5) in general. This is 
also likely due to the priority FDI receives in fulfilling the immediate needs of CA(5) economies. 
It also means that FDI has more power to instigate positive changes in local economies. Even 
though FDI is broadly considered as export oriented, which means that it is not oriented to serve 
local markets, it would render slight positive spillovers. The detailed mechanism of this process 
can be included in future studies.   
Since FDI and ODA complement each other according to our findings, we surmise that 
increase of quality of foreign aid could prepare fertile grounds for FDI activities and vice versa, 
though indirectly. What is more important here is that they are not competing flows - FDI 
improves industrial and foreign aid helps human aspects of growing states.  
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
We were able to draw conclusions on the complicated task of FDI-ODA link on a regional level. 
The main conclusion of our paper is that, on a regional level, aggregate foreign aid had a minor 
facilitating effect, for example, complementing foreign direct investment in Central Asian 
economies. The reverse effect is also present, so we accept the finding of some positive 
association or link between FDI and ODA in the region. Our observation is supported by 
findings of Harms and Lutz (2006), especially, in amateur institutional environments that are 
present in Central Asian economies.  
Another important observation from our study is that FDI flows positively affect 
complementing domestic investment. As it is well known that domestic investment determines 
the size of the stock of capital, and therefore helps determine the long-run growth. Thus, for 
example, foreign aid equally raises the local complimentary inputs quality such as education, 
health while foreign direct investment bring advanced technology and possibly shift the 
production frontier upward and ultimately contribute to a raise in efficiency and productivity. 
Regarding FDI, this also implies that domestic firms are learning to better combine external 
technology with domestic inputs in production process.  
If our finding in the interaction of donor aid to foreign private investment flows nexus is 
true, then international humanitarian organisations indeed could boost positive changes in 
domestic economies in collaboration with multinational companies. This means better 
understanding in the role and value of donor aid could substantially reduce outflows, and 
increase its efficiency via a sort of public-private partnership.  MNEs are most likely to be more 
collaborative with international donors operating in Central Asia and other developing 
economies around the world. 
The future avenues for research on foreign transfers could include juxtaposing different 
models and estimations to results we obtained in the present study. It would be very interesting 
indeed to analyse the effect of disaggregated ODA on aggregate FDI, and also on disaggregated 
one if available data permit us doing so. Understanding which industries accommodate ODA are 
more complements to FDI, could give us clues on location decisions of foreign aid to donor 
agencies. Also, more in-depth studies in disaggregated FDI, such as Greenfield investment 
(building a plant, factory etc.) and portfolio investment (joint ventures, subsidiaries, branches) 
could shed better light on complex relationships and assist in advancing research in Central 
Asian economies.  
 
 
 
Appendices 
Table A1. Data Sources and Descriptions. 
Variable  Name Description Source 
FDI  FDI The Foreign Direct Investment. The value of capital of 
MNEs in host country in real terms.  US Dollars at 
current prices in millions. 
UNCTAD 
    
Official 
Development 
Assistance  
ODA Net official Development Assistance received and aid 
received, US Dollars at current prices in millions. 
World Bank 
Development 
Indicators 
(WDI online) 
Domestic 
Investment 
DOM Gross Fixed Capital Formation minus FDI inflows. This 
way we can obtain local investments by government and 
private sector into fixed assets and human capital less 
payments for foreign debt. US Dollars at current prices in 
millions.  
UNCTAD 
Globalization 
Index 
Glob Globalization Index by KOF.   KOF 
Pop  Population UNCTAD 
CPI  Consumer Price Index IMF 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2. Descriptive statistics Summary: Total Sample. 
Variable Units Obs Mean Std. Dev.        Min   Max 
FDI Millions 
USD 
90 1386.098     8860.164    -1.04715     82458.3 
ODA Millions 
USD 
90 3117.122 23620.93    .3663392    221794.4 
DOM Millions 
USD 
90 1198388 9383478 -1028.761    8.84e+07 
Glob 0-100 85 38.42625     11.10762    15.14242    59.74965 
Pop Millions 
USD 
90 11.13199     7.945662    3.881973    27.12806 
CPI percent
 
90 2.759488     3.828602    1.00e-05    19.14858 
Year years 90   1992 2009 
 
    
 
A3. Variables of the Model 
 
 Dependent Variables 
 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) - this is an aggregate per capita real value in current million 
of US dollars converted into real values dividing by Consumer Price Index (CPI) index. The 
reason for choosing flow and not stock value is because we seek to capture the link between 
FDI-ODA and we cannot do so in the case where FDI is stock, which means it is a part of 
domestic capital.  
Official Development Assistance (ODA) - taken from UNCTAD database and in aggregate 
form. It includes what is actually received (and not disbursed meaning it was allocated, but not 
yet transferred to recipient county) as official development assistance and aid made by DAC 
donor countries. We use yearly aggregate data in this study. Variable was deflated by CPI and 
expressed in natural logarithmic form per capita.  
Gross Fixed Capital Formation (Capital) - this variable is the domestic investment of the 
government into fixed assets such as plants, buildings, roads and infrastructure. Variable was 
deflated by CPI and expressed in natural logarithmic form per capita. Note that this variable is 
also in flow form and it is not a net value (after depreciation). It is investment to domestic capital 
stock.   
 
 
 
 
 
Notes 
 
1. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has a development 
assistance committee (DAC) that base their decision on disbursing financial aid. It has four 
categories: 1.Least Developed Countries; 2. Other Low Income Countries (per capita GNI<$935 
in 2007): Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan; 3. Lower Middle Income Countries and Territories 
(per capita GNI $936-$3.705): Turkmenistan; GNI $3.706-11.455): Kazakhstan. DAC reviews 
every 3 years GNI per capita reported by World Bank and make a list of potential recipients. 
(OECD website: www.oecd.com) 
2. Central Asian economies comprise of: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan. 
3. On principles, mechanism and opinions on effects of ODA see Hansen and Tarp (2000); Dalgaard 
et al. (2004); Lahiri (2006); Bourguignon and Sundberg (2007); Easterly (2007), Mavrotas and 
Nunnenkamp (2007) and Selaya and Sunesen (2008).  We interchangeably call ODA as foreign 
aid in this paper. 
4. Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States and the European Commission (EC). The World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) participate as permanent observers. (OECD, Inside the DAC, A Guide to the OECD 
Development Assistance Committee, 2009-2010). 
5. The United Nations-sponsored summit-level meeting was held in Monterrey, Mexico, from 18 to 
22 March 2002.   
6. Doha Declaration on Financing for Development: outcome document of the Follow-up 
International Conference on Financing for Development to Review the Implementation of the 
Monterrey Consensus. (http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/doha/documents/Doha_Declaration_FFD.pdf ; 
United Nations, 2009) 
7. “Trade and Development Report 2008’, UNCTAD: 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=4580&lang=1  (Accessed 15 December 
2011) 
8. For example, in USA, Bobonis and Shatz, (2007), in Latin America, Bengoa and Sanches-Robles 
(2003), in Europe and Asia (Jaumotte 2004) among other comprehensive studies.  
9. CIS is the abbreviation for Commonwealth of Independent States that created in December 08, 
1991. It consists of twelve countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Georgia (that left CIS on 
August 14, 2008). The three Baltic States (also former Soviet Republics): Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania did not join the CIS.   
10. CEE or CEES-stands for Central and Eastern Europe former communist countries: Baltic States-
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, 
Albania; states of former Yugoslavia- Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina , Serbia, Kosovo, 
Montenegro and Macedonia.  
11. According to reports from World Bank and International Monetary Fund Former Soviet Union 
(FSU), economies classified as Energy Exporters are Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan and Russia and Energy Importers are Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, 
Moldova, Moldavia, Tajikistan and Ukraine. 
12. More detailed analysis on FDI effects on recipient countries consult Navaretti and Venables 
(2004); Mody (2004), Krkoska (2001); Kirkpatrick (2006); Tondel (2001); Carstensen (2004); 
Mileva (2008), Dobrinsky (2007) and recently Hanousek et al., (2011)   
13. FDI is classified as “Greenfield investment” when the MNEs invest by building new factories, 
plants, offices, entities and buildings in host country. These new economic units have their own 
accounting books.  
14. Since our sample is in long panel format we technically cannot apply traditional fixed (FE) or 
random effects (FE) modelling or similar estimators such as instrumental variable (IV) 
generalized method of moments (GMM),that are based on large N and small T assumption 
regarding a sample. However, we could apply pooled estimators such as generalised least squares 
GLS but it does not allow us simultaneity estimate our equations. (Baum, 2006, Cameron and 
Trivedi, 2009).  
15. We deflated monetary variables by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) from IMF (2000=100). 
16. Soviet Union had 15 Republics that after the break were all collectively called Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS).  The breakdown of countries by geographical markup is following: 
Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan); Baltic 
(Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania); Eastern Europe (Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine); Eurasia (Russia); 
Transcaucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia);  
17. Independence status officially declared: Kazakhstan (December 16, 1991); Kyrgyzstan (August 
31, 1991); Tajikistan (September 9, 1991); Turkmenistan (October 27, 1991) and Uzbekistan 
(September 1, 1991). 
18. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan were included in the sample. 
Source:  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Asia (Accessed 15 December 2011) 
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